Philosophy

	Descriptions of talks: "Human Rights during National Emergencies" by Jim Nickel "Nietzsche's Magnificent Tension of The Spirit" by Maudemarie Clark "Hegel and the Politics of Recognition" by Larry Krasnoff "Impiety in a Secular Age" by Cora Diamond "Buddhist Non-Self and Reasons for Caring" by Mark Siderits Human Rights during National Emergencies by Jim Nickel Governments often respond to national emergencies, including terrorist attacks, by restricting and suspending people's rights. Three major human rights treaties set limits on such suspensions. This lecture explains the issues and discusses some examples, describes briefly the limits the international treaties set, and offers a normative framework for thinking about which rights can be suspended during emergencies. Nietzsche's Magnificent Tension of The Spirit by Maudemarie Clark This paper is an interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphor the "magnificent tension of the spirit" with which he identifies the present of philosophy in the preface to Beyond Good and Evil. The future of philosophy he has in mind depends on being able to maintain and make productive use of this tension. The paper attempts to explain what this tension is and to show how understanding it in a particular way can help us to interpret some otherwise difficult passages in The Gay Science. The paper also explores the senses in which Nietzsche is–and is not–a naturalist. Hegel and the Politics of Recognition by Larry Krasnoff Hegel's notion of recognition (Anerkennung) has long been seen as crucial to his ethical and political thought. But what does Hegel mean when he argues that a person requires recognition by others? Quite a few interpreters understand this claim to imply a kind of internal critique of liberal or Kantian conceptions of legitimacy, and thus an argument for a kind of communitarianism. Recently Charles Taylor has argued that Hegel's theory of recognition can be used to show that liberals ought to become multiculturalists of a certain kind. In this talk I argue that interpretations like Taylor's distort the account of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit. There is in fact no reason to think that Hegel would reject a Kantian account of legitimacy; Hegel's critique of Kant is of a different sort. I conclude with some reflections on what this means for multiculturalism, for a contemporary politics of recognition. Impiety in a Secular Age by Cora Diamond We human beings interfere with nature all the time in order to accomplish our ends. Is there any part of the natural order in which we ought not ever to interfere? Are any interferences ruled out? It can be argued that, unless we appeal to religion, no interferences in the natural order are in principle ruled out for us. This talk examines this idea and explores various approaches to the problem of impiety in a secular age. Buddhist Non-Self and Reasons for Caring by Mark Siderits Most people agree that we ought to care about the suffering of others-that we have an obligation to alleviate it when we can. What is less clear is what reasons there might be for caring. There are several popular approaches to grounding an obligation for benevolence: an appeal to enlightened self-interest, an appeal to the will of God, an appeal to alleged facts about the human essence. Buddhists agree that there is such an obligation, but reject all these approaches. Instead they claim that the obligation follows from the fact that there is no self. This claim is sometimes represented as the view that once we realize that we lack selves, we will see that we are all connected, and this will cause us to care more about others. But this misrepresents the Buddhist view. It presupposes that we are self-interested, and merely tries to expand the dimensions of the self. Buddhists deny there is a self, so their grounding of benevolence cannot rely on an appeal to self-interest. What they can do is try to explain why we believe persons are naturally self-interested when in fact there is no self. I explore how their explanation of this belief supplies the premises for an argument to the effect that we are rationally obligated to care about others' suffering.
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Descriptions of talks:

"Human Rights during National Emergencies"
by Jim Nickel

"Nietzsche's Magnificent Tension of The Spirit"
by Maudemarie Clark

"Hegel and the Politics of Recognition"
by Larry Krasnoff

"Impiety in a Secular Age"
by Cora Diamond

"Buddhist Non-Self and Reasons for Caring"
by Mark Siderits

Human Rights during National Emergencies
by Jim Nickel

Governments often respond to national emergencies, including terrorist attacks, by restricting and suspending people's rights. Three major human rights treaties set limits on such suspensions. This lecture explains the issues and discusses some examples, describes briefly the limits the international treaties set, and offers a normative framework for thinking about which rights can be suspended during emergencies.

Nietzsche's Magnificent Tension of The Spirit
by Maudemarie Clark

This paper is an interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphor the "magnificent tension of the spirit" with which he identifies the present of philosophy in the preface to Beyond Good and Evil. The future of philosophy he has in mind depends on being able to maintain and make productive use of this tension. The paper attempts to explain what this tension is and to show how understanding it in a particular way can help us to interpret some otherwise difficult passages in The Gay Science. The paper also explores the senses in which Nietzsche is–and is not–a naturalist.

Hegel and the Politics of Recognition
by Larry Krasnoff

Hegel's notion of recognition (Anerkennung) has long been seen as crucial to his ethical and political thought. But what does Hegel mean when he argues that a person requires recognition by others? Quite a few interpreters understand this claim to imply a kind of internal critique of liberal or Kantian conceptions of legitimacy, and thus an argument for a kind of communitarianism. Recently Charles Taylor has argued that Hegel's theory of recognition can be used to show that liberals ought to become multiculturalists of a certain kind. In this talk I argue that interpretations like Taylor's distort the account of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit. There is in fact no reason to think that Hegel would reject a Kantian account of legitimacy; Hegel's critique of Kant is of a different sort. I conclude with some reflections on what this means for multiculturalism, for a contemporary politics of recognition.

Impiety in a Secular Age
by Cora Diamond

We human beings interfere with nature all the time in order to accomplish our ends. Is there any part of the natural order in which we ought not ever to interfere? Are any interferences ruled out? It can be argued that, unless we appeal to religion, no interferences in the natural order are in principle ruled out for us. This talk examines this idea and explores various approaches to the problem of impiety in a secular age.

Buddhist Non-Self and Reasons for Caring
by Mark Siderits

Most people agree that we ought to care about the suffering of others-that we have an obligation to alleviate it when we can. What is less clear is what reasons there might be for caring. There are several popular approaches to grounding an obligation for benevolence: an appeal to enlightened self-interest, an appeal to the will of God, an appeal to alleged facts about the human essence. Buddhists agree that there is such an obligation, but reject all these approaches. Instead they claim that the obligation follows from the fact that there is no self. This claim is sometimes represented as the view that once we realize that we lack selves, we will see that we are all connected, and this will cause us to care more about others. But this misrepresents the Buddhist view. It presupposes that we are self-interested, and merely tries to expand the dimensions of the self. Buddhists deny there is a self, so their grounding of benevolence cannot rely on an appeal to self-interest. What they can do is try to explain why
we believe persons are naturally self-interested when in fact there is no self. I explore how their explanation of this belief supplies the premises for an argument to the effect that we are rationally obligated to care about others' suffering.